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Abstract
Who provides liquidity in modern, electronic limit order book, markets? While agency trading can 
be constrained by conicts of interest and information asymmetry between customers and traders, prop 
traders are likely to be less constrained and thus better positioned to carry inventory risk. Moreover, 
while slow traderslimit orders may be exposed to severe adverse selection, fast trading technology 
can improve tradersability to monitor the market and avoid being picked o¤. To shed light on these 
points, we rely on unique data from Euronext and the AMF enabling us to observe the connectivity 
of traders to the market, and whether they are proprietary traders. We nd that proprietary traders, 
be they fast or slow, provide liquidity with contrarian marketable orders, thus helping the market 
absorb shocks, even during crisis, and earn prots doing so. Moreover, fast traders provide liquidity 
by leaving limit orders in the book. Yet, only prop traders can do so without making losses. This 
suggests that technology is not enough to overcome adverse selection, monitoring incentives are also 
needed.
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limit order book, shortterm momentum, contrarian.
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1 Introduction
In perfect markets, buyers and sellers immediately nd each other and reap gains from trade at
frictionless prices. Real markets, however, can fall short from delivering such welfare improvements,
due to frictions.
Market frictions, indeed, can prevent nal sellers from rapidly locating nal buyers. In this con-
text, intermediaries can provide liquidity to impatient sellers, by purchasing their assets and holding
inventories, until they nd nal buyers. Such marketmaking services have been analyzed theoret-
ically by Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983), Grossman and Miller (1988) and Weill (2007).2 What are the
characteristics of intermediaries which enable them to supply liquidity? In fragmented markets, inter-
mediation services can be provided by those agents with the best network linkages and the greatest
search ability, which can be enhanced by highfrequency trading technology. Even if the market is
centralized, delays can arise, reecting that not all potential buyers and sellers are permanently mon-
itoring the market, and that it takes time for investors to identify their trading needs, as analyzed
theoretically by Biais, Hombert and Weill (2014). In this context, as in that of fragmented markets,
Gromb and Vayanos (2002) show that arbitrageurs, able to take positions in di¤erent markets, can
provide valuable liquidity. Market makers, however, bear costs when holding inventories, e.g., because
they are riskaverse and reluctant to carry unbalanced inventory positions, as analyzed theoretically
by Ho and Stoll (1981), or because the principals of market makers set position limits to discipline their
agents. This suggests that the agents best placed to o¤er liquidity are those with the best inventory
holding ability, i.e, those with the greatest risktolerance or the least acute agency problems. Because
the aggregate inventory bearing capacity of market makers is limited, however, liquidity shocks have
a transient impact on prices, i.e., there are limits to arbitrage, and liquidity supply is protable
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, and Gromb and Vayanos, 2002, 2010, 2015).
Another market friction limiting liquidity is adverse selection. As rst shown by Akerlof (1970),
adverse selection can magnify the price impact of trades and even lead to market breakdown. As
shown by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985), adverse selection leads market makers to post
relatively high ask prices, and relatively low bid prices. Here again, however, the question arises: which
2Symmetric arguments hold for the case of impatient buyers. In that case, market makers can provide liquidity by
selling assets they hold in inventory, or by shortselling the asset.
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agents will play the role of market makers, and why? E¢ ciency suggests that the intermediaries should
be the agents who are best able to mitigate adverse selection. Such ability could reect better market
monitoring technology, enabling intermediaries to cancel their orders before they are picked o¤. This,
however, could worsen the adverse selection problem for other investors, with less e¢ cient monitoring
technologies. Adverse selection for these investors could be further amplied if intermediaries took
advantage of their timely market information to hit stale quotes themselves.
Since the beginning of the century, three developments have made these questions highly topical.
First, equity markets have converged towards an electronic limit order book structure, in which a large
number of di¤erent nancial institutions (not just designated market makers) can provide liquidity by
leaving limit orders in the book. Second, low latency technologies have become available, increasing,
at a cost, the ability to monitor changes in market conditions and react rapidly to them. Third,
regulatory reforms before the crisis contributed to the fragmentation of markets and the development
of highfrequency trading, while regulatory reforms after the crisis made proprietary trading more
costly and complex for investment banks.3 How have these developments changed the economics of
liquidity supply, and the gains from trades that can be reaped in nancial markets? To shed light on
these issues, we empirically analyze a new dataset, with information about the orders and trades of
di¤erent categories of members of Euronext, including proprietary traders and highfrequency traders.
Our data includes a timestamped record of all orders and trades (quantities and prices) on Eu-
ronext in French stocks during 2010. Our sample period brackets the Greek crisis of the summer of
2010, enabling us to analyze how liquidity supply compares between normaland crisis times. Our
data also includes anonymized member codes, and for each member, we know i) the quality and speed
of its connection to the market, and ii) if its trades were 100% proprietary, 100% agency, or a mix of
both. Using i) we identify fast traders based on direct information about their technological invest-
ment, which contrasts with indirect identication, based on trading style. Because of its huge size,
and also because of some technical characteristics of the Euronext market,4 this dataset is di¢ cult to
3Correspondingly, some investment banks had to move their prop trading activities to seggregated subsidiaries, such
as, e.g., Descartes Trading for Société Générale.
4The majority of markets refresh the limit order book at the end of the trading day, eliminating unexecuted limit
orders. This is not the case in Euronext, where a limit order can be left in the book for up to one year. Consequently
there are many remaining limit orders, far from the quotes. This increases the size of the dataset.
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handle. At this stage, we have analyzed 23 French stocks, including 10 large caps, 9 mid caps, and 4
small caps. The size of the corresponding data exceeds 7 teraoctets.
Our rst main empirical nding relates to liquidity supply. We nd that proprietary traders, be
they fast or slow, tend to place marketable buy orders after price declines, and marketable sell orders
after price increases. Thus, we nd that proprietary traders follow contrarian strategies, buying against
downward price pressure, and selling against upward price pressure. This contrasts with the other
traders, who tend to buy after price rises and sell after price declines, which can be interpreted as
momentum trading. While the proprietary traderscontrarian strategies rely on marketable orders,
they supply liquidity to the market. This is consistent with proprietary traders being better able to
carry inventory risk than other traders. This might be because they commit their own capital, rather
than trading on other peoples behalf. This could also reect better incentive contracts. In both cases,
superior ability to carry inventory risk would stem from having more skin in the game.
Market liquidity could be hampered if liquidity supply evaporated in times of market stress (see,
e.g., Nagel 2012). Interestingly, the contrarian strategies of proprietary traders are particularly preva-
lent for small stocks, and during the Greek crisis. Thus, they are not fair weatherliquidity suppliers,
disappearing when the market most needs them. Moreover, the contrarian strategies of proprietary
traders are on average protable. This suggests they are able to identify when transient price pressure,
possibly reecting liquidity shocks, has driven prices away from equilibrium. In those circumstances,
proprietary tradersmarketable orders conduct risky arbitrage. Thus, by absorbing selling or buying
pressure, they tend to stabilize the market.
Our second major empirical nding relates to adverse selection. We nd that the information
content of marketable orders, although signicantly positive, does not signicantly di¤er across mem-
berscategories. In particular, fast tradersmarketable orders dont seem to be more informed than
those of slower traders. In contrast, we nd that the adverse selection cost borne by nonimmediately
executed limit orders is signicantly lower for fast proprietary traders. On the other hand, adverse
selection costs are high for fast nonproprietary traderslimit orders. This suggests that technology,
in itself, is not enough to mitigate adverse selection. It is also necessary that the traders have the
incentives to use the technology e¢ ciently. Moreover, while fast proprietary traders frequently trade
with nonimmediately executed limit orders, slow proprietary traders only unfrequently do so. Thus,
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while slow proprietary traders mainly supply liquidity by placing contrarian marketable orders, fast
proprietary traders also supply liquidity by placing non immediately executed limit orders. We nd,
however, that this second type of liquidity supply becomes much less prevalent after the crisis.
Literature: Our paper relates to the rich literature empirically analyzing algorithmic and high
frequency trading:
Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011) show that liquidity provision in equity market is provided
by algorithmic traders who are not o¢ cially designated as market makers.
Brogaard, Hendershott, Riordan (2014) analyze NASDAQ data, relying on a classication of
traders performed by the market organizers. They nd that HFTs marketable orders have infor-
mation content, but not signicantly more than other tradersmarketable orders. They also nd
that HFTs orders tend to be contrarian and are on average protable. Thus, our empirical ndings
complement those of Brogaard, Hendershott, Riordan (2014) in two ways:
 Our ndings relative to highfrequency traders are similar to theirs, and thus speak to the
robustness of their results to a di¤erent market and a di¤erent way to identify highfrequency
traders.
 Our ndings on proprietary traders are new, and thus provide an incremental contribution to the
literature. We show that several characteristics of high-frequency tradersorders (i.e., contrarian,
protable, and marketable) are also characteristics of the slow proprietary tradersorders in our
data. This suggests that these traders are able to place contrarian and protable orders not
because they have lowlatency, but because they are proprietary traders.5
Brogaard, Hagstromer, Norden, Riordan (2014) nd that the choice to colocate is followed by
reduced adverse selection costs. Our results on adverse selection are in line with their ndings. Our
incremental contribution, here, is to emphasize that technology may not be su¢ cient to reduce adverse
selection. Appropriate incentives to use the technology e¢ ciently seem to be also needed.
Hendershott and Menkveld (2014) o¤er a state space model to identify how price pressure relates
to the specialists inventory. In a sense, the proprietary traders in our data play a similar role to the
5The highfrequency traders identied by NASDAQ are very likely to also be proprietary traders.
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specialist in Hendershott and Menkveld (2014).6
Our paper is also in line with analyses of liquidity supply by market participants that are not
o¢ cially designated as market makers. Franzoni and Plazzi (2014) document liquidity supply by
hedge funds, classifying as liquidity supply purchases (resp. sales) at a price below (resp. above) a
benchmark (e.g., the opening price or the VWAP). Nagel (2012) argues that the returns on shortterm
reversals can be interpreted as the returns from liquidity provision. Since, in our data, we observe
the type of the market participants and the details of their orders, we can rely on more precise data
to directly identify liquidity supply. Our empirical nding that proprietary traders supply liquidity
with protable contrarian trades conrm the relevance of the approch of Nagel (2012) and Franzoni
and Plazzi (2014). Moreover, Nagel (2012) interprets high return on liquidity supply strategies when
the VIX is high as evidence that liquidity supply is reduced at those times. Our direct evidence on
liquidity supply o¤er some nuance on this point: On the one hand, we nd that proprietary traders
continued to place protable marketable contrarian orders during the Greek crisis of the summer of
2010, so, in that sense, liquidity did not evaporate. On the other hand, we nd that the crisis
triggered a drop in the placement of nonimmediately executed limit orders in small caps by fast
proprietary traders. Other things equal, this corresponds to a decline in liquidity supply.
The next section presents our data and summary statistics. Section 3 analyzes the placement and
informational content of marketable orders. Section 4 analyzes the adverse selection costs incurred
by non immediately executed limit orders. Section 5 summarizes our results and discusses policy
implications.
2 Market structure, data and summary statistics
Euronext is an electronic limit order market, operating continuously for most of the stocks. Orders
are submitted by the nancial institutions that are members of Euronext. Members are assigned
an identication code. Most institutions have a single ID code, but some choose to have up to four
di¤erent codes to di¤erentiate their activities (e.g., brokerage versus proprietary trading). Each ID
6Furthermore, Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, Tuzun (2014) nd that HFTs did not cause the Flash Crash but exacerbated
it. Menkveld (2013) document liquidity supply by large HFT across ChiX & Euronext.
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code can have several links to the exchange. The total fee charged by Euronext to a member depends
on the number of links connected to the Euronext servers, and on the capacity of each link. This
capacity is named throughput, and indicates the maximum number of messages (order submission,
cancellation or modication of an existing order) that the traders are allowed to send to the Exchange
in one calendar second via this link. The throughput of each link can be 10, 25, 50, 100, 200, 250,
or 500. It seems that a large throughput does not only increase the number of messages that can be
sent, but also increases the speed with which they reach the market. We are able to document this
empirically because, in our data, we observe (at the microsecond level) the time at which an order was
sent to the market and the time at which the order was executed. We also observe the throughput of
the link via which the order was sent. Marketable orders, by construction, are immediately executed.
Thus, for these orders, the di¤erence between the execution time and the submission time is an inverse
measure of the speed of the connection. In Figure 1, panel A, we plot for each link, the median of
this time di¤erence against the throughput of the link. The gure illustrates that links with higher
throughput tend to also have higher connection speed. Moreover, Euronext further proposes to its
Members to colocate their servers close to its owns.7 Colocation fees depend on the physical space
used by the Member, and on the electricity consumption of the servers.
We obtained our data from the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (the French nancial markets
regulator) and Euronext. So far, we have analyzed 23 French stocks between February 2010 and
August 2010. The sample includes 10 large caps (1 nancial and 9 nonnancial with oat between
1,048 and 3,884 million euros), 9 mid caps (1 nancial and 8 non nancial, with oat between 181 and
960 million euros), and 4 small caps (all non nancial, with oat between 51 and 145 million euros).
150 Euronext member IDs traded these stocks during the sample period. 28 of them only traded
on their own account, and we classify them as prop traders. 37 only traded on behalf of customers and
we classify them as pure brokers. 85 conducted some trades on their own account and some trades on
behalf of customers. We classify them as dual traders.8
7 In May 2010, Euronext servers were moved to Basildon (in the neighbourhood of London, UK). Members can choose
to colocate some, all or none of their links.
8Actually, for each trade we observe if it was reported by the member as proprietary or agency. But we have been told
by market participants that these reports can be quite noisy. To reduce the impact of such noise, we chose to classify as
pure proprietary traders those reporting only proprietary trades and as pure brokers those reporting only agency trades.
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As mentioned above, we observe the number of links for each member ID, and the throughput of
each link. For each member ID, we compute the messaging capacity, i.e., the sum of the throughputs of
all the links. As discussed above, in line of Figure 1, Panel A, messaging capacity is also correlated with
speed of connection. Figure 1, Panel B, illustrates the distribution across member IDs of messaging
capacities. They range between 0 and 4600. Traders with higher capacity and higher connection
speed can observe changes in market conditions faster and react faster to them. We chose to classify
as fast traders the 17 members with capacity above 1300 messages per second. We checked that our
qualitative results were robust to changing the threshold, e.g., setting it at 800 or 1600.
Out of the 17 fast traders, 6 are proprietary traders while the 11 others are dual traders. Members
ID codes are anonymized, so we dont observe the identity of the traders, nor do we have direct
information about their types. We, however, have some indirect information, unrelated to the dataset,
based on which we formed conjectures. It is highly likely that the 6 fast proprietary traders are high
frequency trading boutiques, similar to the highfrequency traders identied in the Nasdaq dataset.
Moreover, it is likely that the 11 fast dual traders are, typically, European banks, sending proprietary
trades as well as agency trades to the exchange via the same membership channel.
Out of the 133 slow traders, 22 are proprietary traders, 74 are dual traders, and 37 are pure
brokers. Once again, because the dataset is anonymized, we have no direct information about who
these members are. It is likely, however, that the 22 slow proprietary traders include proprietary
trading desks of large investment banks with their own membership and possibly some hedge funds.
Combining the two criteria, we classify the members in our sample into 5 categories: fast prop
traders, slow proptraders, fast dual traders, slow dual traders, and slow brokers. Note that no pure
broker in our sample was fast. This does not mean they had absolutely no highfrequency trading
technology. It is likely they also rely on algorithms, e.g., to search for best execution. Their connections
to the market, however, are less advanced than that of the fast traders.
As mentioned above, our sample period brackets the Greek crisis of the summer of 2010. Figure
2 plots the evolution of the VIX volatility index during our sample period. The Vix jumps on April
23rd, when Greece asks for a bailout, and remains elevated until late June. Thus, we split our sample
in three subperiods: The rst period, before the crisis, is from February 23 to April 22. The second
period, corresponding to the crisis, is from April 23 to June 22. The third period, after the crisis, is
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from June 23 to August 23.
Figure 3 depicts the number of trades per member, per stock, per day. Figure 3, Panel A, shows
that fast traders (both proprietary and dual) trade more often, and rely more on non immediately
executed limit orders, than slow traders. Slow proprietary traders trade less than fast traders, but more
than other slow traders. Moreover, unlike fast proprietary traders, they rely mainly on marketable
orders.
Panels B and C of Figure 3 show how these results vary with market capitalization and periods.
Comparing Panel B (large caps) and Panel C (small and mid caps), the number of trades is much
larger for the former than for the larger. Furthermore, for large caps the number of trades increases
during the crisis, but the relative frequencies of marketable orders and nonimmediately executed limit
orders are rather stable through time. For small caps, however, the behavior of fast proprietary traders
is quite di¤erent. First their trading volume does not increase during the crisis. Second, while before
the crisis they frequently traded via non immediately executable limit orders, during and after the
crisis they considerably reduce their reliance on this type of trade. This is an important observation,
to which we come back below, when we analyze how the crisis a¤ected adverse selection costs.
Figure 4 o¤ers a graphical illustration of the frequency with which each category of tradersmar-
ketable orders hit each category of traders limit orders. Each color corresponds to the category of
the trader whose marketable order was executed. For example, the plain red bar corresponds to the
marketable orders placed by fast proprietary traders. It shows that, when a fast prop trader places
a marketable order, 19% of the time it hits another fast trader, 8% of the time it hits a slow prop
trader, 41% of the time it hits a fast dual trader, 27% of the time it hits a slow dual trader, and 4%
of the time it hits a pure brokers order. Interestingly, the frequencies are very similar for marketable
orders placed by other categories of traders. So, its not the case that fast traders targeta certain
category of traders limit orders.
3 Marketable orders
To estimate the information content of orders in the simplest possible way, we use the percentage
change from the midquote just before the trade to the midquote 2 minutes after the trade. Thus, for
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a trade taking place at time t, the information content is
Mt+2  Mt 
Mt 
 signt;
where Mt  denotes the midquote just before the trade, Mt+2 denotes the midquote 2 minutes after
the trade, and signt takes the value 1 if the timet marketable order is a buy order, and -1 if the
timet marketable order is a sell order.
Figure 5, Panel A, depicts the informational content of the marketable orders placed by di¤erent
categories of traders. After a marketable buy (resp. sell) order placed by a fast proprietary trader,
the midquote increases (resp. decreases) on average by 3.5 basis points. The informational content
of the marketable orders placed by other categories of traders are not very di¤erent, ranging between
3.4 and 4.1 basis points. This suggests that the marketable orders placed by fast traders are not more
informed than the marketable orders placed by other traders. Correspondingly, they dont generate
more adverse selection for limit orders standing in the book.
Figure 5, Panel B, depicts how the informational content of marketable orders varies across stocks
and through time.9 It shows that, for all traders, the informational content of orders is larger for small
caps and during the crisis, and remains higher after the crisis than before. Also, while, as shown in
Figure 5, Panel A, fast tradersorders are, in general, not better informed than other tradersorders,
during the crisis they are.
Figure 6 depicts the evolution of the midquote 5 minutes before and after the placement of a
marketable order by the di¤erent categories of traders, i.e., it plots the average of
Mt+h  Mt 
Mt 
 signt;
where h varies from -5 minutes to +5 minutes. Panel A shows the results for large caps, while Panel
B shows the results for small caps. The two panels conrm the above discussed ndings that, after
the trade, the information content of marketable orders is similar for all categories of members, and is
higher for small stocks. The new information in Figure 6, relative to Figure 5, is about what happens
before the trade. Figure 6 shows that dual traders or brokers place marketable buy (resp. sell) orders
9The information content of fast prop tradersorders is larger than that of other traders for all subcases in Panel
B. This does not contradict the fact that it is not higher in Panel A, because fast proprietary traders are relative more
active in large cap (for which the informational content of orders is lower) than in small caps.
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after price increases (resp. decreases). This is consistent with dual traders and brokers riding short
term momentum waves, or splitting orders. In stark contrast, fast proprietary traders (be they fast or
slow), buy after price decreases and sell after price increases. That is, they follow contrarian strategies.
Thus their marketable orders supply liquidity to the market, helping it accomodate buying or selling
pressure.
Is such liquidity supply robust ? Or does this liquidity evaporate when the market really needs it,
e.g., in times of crisis? To shed light on this, Figure 7 depicts the evolution of the midquote 5 minutes
before and after the placement of a marketable order, similarly to Figure 6, but distinguishing between
the period before the crisis (Panel A), during the crisis (Panel B) and after the crisis (Panel C). The
gure shows that there are no qualitative di¤erences across periods. During the three periods, dual
traders and pure brokers buy after price rises and sell after price drops. And, during the three periods,
proprietary traders buy after price drops and sell after price rises. The only di¤erence is that, during
the crisis, the magnitude of the price changes is larger. Thus, the liquidity supplied to the market by
the contrarian orders of proprietary traders does not seem to evaporate during times of market stress.
Our results are consistent with those of Brogaard, Hendershott, Riordan (2014), who nd that
HFTs marketable orders tend to be contrarian. Indeed, the HFT rms identied by Brogaard,
Hendershott, Riordan (2014) are likely to be proprietary traders. The new nding in the present
study is that slow traders also place such contrarian marketable orders, when they are proprietary
traders. This suggests that what enables traders to conduct such contrarian strategies is maybe not
technology but the ability to trade on ones own account. That ability reduces agency conicts between
investors and traders, and thus increases the ability to carry incentory, and, correspondingly, supply
liquidity to the market.
While such liquidity supply could be benecial to the market, by accomodating liquidity shocks,
one could wonder whether it is sustainable. In particular, is it protable? To shed light on this, we
computed the average prots of the marketable orders placed by the di¤erent categories of market
participants. To estimate the protability of orders in the simplest possible way, we use the percentage
di¤erence between the transaction price and the midquote 2 minutes after the trade. Thus, for a
marketable order executed at time t, the prot is
Mt+2   Pt
Mt 
 signt;
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where Pt denotes the transaction price, Mt+2 denotes the midquote 2 minutes after the trade, and
signt takes the value 1 if the timet marketable order is a buy order, and -1 if the timet marketable
order is a sell order.
Figure 8 depicts the results. Panel A of Figure 8 shows that proprietary traders marketable orders
earn positive prots: .8 bp on average for fast proprietary traders, and 1.7 bp on average for slow
proprietary traders. This suggests that the ability of proprietary traders to supply liquidity with
contrarian orders is sustainable, in the sense that it is protable.10
Panel A of Figure 8 shows that, in contrast, the momentum riding strategies of other traders appear
to be nonprotable. In particular, slow dual traders loose on average around 1.1 bp per trade, and
slow brokers almost 4 bp. Thus, while these orders trade in the direction of market movement, buying
before price increases and selling before declines, they are not protable, because the spread they have
to pay exceeds their informational content.
Panel B of Figure 8 shows how the protability of marketable orders vary with the market capi-
talization of the traded stocks and with the crisis. Both the prots of the proprietary traders and the
losses of the other traders are larger for small caps than for large caps. Furthermore, the protability
of fast proprietary tradersmarketable orders increase during the crisis, while those of slow propri-
etary traders decrease somewhat for small caps, but remain largely positive. This is consistent with
the results depicted in Figure 7: Proprietary traders continue to supply liquidity to the market via
contrarian marketable orders during the crisis, and this activity continues to be protable.
As mentioned above, the behaviour we interpret as momentum riding could in fact reect order
splitting. We can address this issue because our data contains the ID codes of market participants
(anonymized of course.) If order splitting was the reason why dual traders and slow brokers bought
after price rises (and sell after drops), we should see that, after a dual trader or broker placed a
marketable order, the next marketable order would often be in the same direction and stemming
from the same trader. To o¤er evidence on this point, we estimate a contingency table in the same
spirit as in Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995). Figure 9 presents the probability that, after a marketable
order was placed by a given category of participant, the next marketable order is placed by the same
10Proprietary trades are exempted from trading fees on Euronext, so the above mentioned protability is not eliminated
by exchange fees.
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participant or another one, and is the same direction or the opposite one. The gure shows that,
after a marketable order was placed by a fast dual trader, the probability that the next marketable
order stems from the same trader is below 10%. For slow dual traders, this probability is between 10
and 15%, for slow brokers it is between 15 and 20%. These frequencies are not very large, suggesting
that order splitting is not the main driving force, and momentum trading is likely to be at play.
Interestingly, after a marketable order was placed by a fast prop trader, the probability that the next
marketable order stems from the same trader is very low (around 5%), while after a marketable order
from a slow prop trader its is very large (above 35%). This suggests, that, at least in the case of slow
prop traders, order splitting and contrarian liquidity supply coexist. Another implication from Figure
9 is that order splitting seems to be more prevalent for slow traders than for fast traders.
The overall message emerging from the above discussed ndings is the following: Slow traders tend
to split orders, while fast traders engage less in order splitting. Proprietary traders help the market
absorb liquidity shocks by placing contrarian marketable orders, while other traders tend to consume
liquidity by riding momentum waves.
4 Adverse selection costs incurred by limit orders
Limit orders left in the book are exposed to adverse selection, as analyzed, e.g., by Glosten and
Milgrom (1985), Glosten (1994) and Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000). Fast trading technology,
however, enhances tradersability to monitor market movements. This may enable them to cancel or
modify stale quotes, before they receive adverse execution.
To estimate the adverse selection cost incurred by limit orders in the book, we use the percentage
change from the midquote just before the trade to the midquote 2 minutes after the trade. Thus, for
a trade taking place at time t, the information content is
Mt+2  Mt 
Mt 
 signlimitt ;
where Mt  denotes the midquote just before the trade, Mt+2 denotes the midquote 2 minutes after
the trade, and signlimitt takes the value 1 if the limit order hit at timet is a buy order, and -1 if it is
a sell order. This is similar to the measure of information content illustrated in Figure 5, but, while
in Figure 5 we condition on the type and direction of the aggressive marketable order, in Figure 10
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we condition on the type and direction of the passive limit order (hit by a marketable order).
Figure 10, Panel A, shows that, after a limit buy (resp. sell) order left in the book by a fast
proprietary trader is executed, the midquote decreases (resp. increases) on average by 2.8 basis
points. The adverse selection costs of limit orders left in the book by other categories of traders are
3.1 bp for slow proprietary traders, 3.8 bp for fast dual traders, 4.1 bp for slow dual traders and 5
bp for slow brokers. Thus, the adverse selection cost is lowest for fast proprietary traders. Adverse
selection costs are higher for fast nonproprietary traders. This suggests that technology, in itself, is
not enough to mitigate adverse selection. It is also necessary that the traders have the incentives to
use the technology e¢ ciently.
Figure 10, Panel B, compares adverse selection costs before, during and after the crisis, and also
across large and small caps. Overall, adverse selection costs are higher for small caps. They are also
higher during the crisis. There are some di¤erences between the di¤erent categories of traders:
 For nonproprietary traders, adverse selection costs increase during the crisis, and remain ele-
vated afterwards.
 For slow proprietary traders, there is a similar pattern, except that adverse selection costs decline
after the crisis.
 For fast proprietary traders, while the pattern is similar for small and mid caps, for large caps
adverse selection costs remain low throughout the period, and are not higher during or after
the crisis. This is consistent with the patterns depicted in Panels B and C of Figure 3: Fast
proprietary traders seem to be able to control adverse selection costs for large caps during the
crisis, and thus continue to supply liquidity in these stocks via limit orders. In contrast, for small
and mid caps, their adverse selection costs increase and they reduce their limit order liquidity
supply. This is a form of liquidity evaporation.
Figure 11 depicts the prots earned by limit orders left in the book, estimated as
Mt+2   Pt
Mt 
 signlimitt ;
where Pt denotes the transaction price, Mt+2 denotes the midquote 2 minutes after the trade, and
signlimitt takes the value 1 if the limit order hit at timet is a buy order, and -1 if it is a sell order.
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Panel A of Figure 11 shows that the limit orders of fast proprietary traders (and also those of slow
dual traders) earn slightly positive prots on average. That is, for these orders, the bidask spread
(which they earn) is slightly larger than the adverse selection cost (which they incur). In contrast,
the limit orders left in the book by dual fast traders loose 3 bp per trade on average, and those of
slow proprietary traders 8 bp per trade. That is, for these limit orders the adverse selection cost is so
large that it exceeds the spread. This is consistent with i) our observation above that slow proprietary
traders rarely use nonimmediately executable orders and ii) the conjecture that they are aware that
such orders would be loss making for them.
Panel B of Figure 11 shows that the protability of non immediately executed limit orders varies
considerably with capitalization and period. Both losses and prots are much lower for large caps.
The most striking result is the large protability of fast proprietary traders limit orders in small
caps during the crisis and afterwards. These are the most di¢ cult stocks and times, for which adverse
selection costs are the largest, as shown in Figurer 10, Panel B. Yet, fast proprietary traders apparently
are able to earn the spread to such an extent that they more than o¤set these costs.
The results in Figures 10 and 11 suggest that fast proprietary traderslimit orders are less adversely
selected than others, in line with the notion that fast proprietary traders monitor the market and often
cancel or modify their orders before receiving adverse execution. To document this point, we computed
the number of cancellations and the number of updates to less aggressive quotes for each category of
trader, normalizing these numbers by the number of trades. Figure 12 shows that, for fast proprietary
traders, the number of updates to less aggressive quotes is 3.7 times as large as the number of trades
outside the crisis, and 4.2 times during the crisis. For cancellations, these numbers are 12.8 outside
the crisis, and 15.1 during the crisis. These numbers are much larger than the corresponding numbers
for fast dual traders and much, much larger than the corresponding numbers for other categories of
traders. That the frequency of cancellations and modications by fast proprietary traders is higher
during the crisis, suggests that these traders exerted more e¤ort monitoring the market and adjusting
to it. The cost of this e¤ort increased the cost of leaving limit orders in the book during the crisis.
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5 Conclusion and policy implications
We analyze a unique dataset enabling us to observe, in addition to time stamped orders and trades
on Euronext, the number of messages per second traders can exchange with the market, and whether
they are prop traders. Our sample period, in 2010, brackets the Greek crisis of the summer of 2010.
We nd that proprietary traders, be they fast or slow, tend to place marketable buy orders af-
ter price drops, and marketable sell orders after price increases. And, after they have bought, the
market tends to recover, while, after they have sold, the market tends to retreat. This is consistent
with proprietary traders helping the market accomodate liquidity shocks, and thus reducing transient
deviation from e¢ cient pricing. Moreover, we nd that this liquidity supply remains available during
the crisis. In that sense, liquidity supply by proprietary traders does not evaporate when it is most
needed.
We also nd that the limit orders of fast proprietary traders (but not other fast traders) incur lower
adverse selection costs than the limit orders of other traders. Our results suggest that fast proprietary
traders supply liquidity to the market via contrarian marketable orders and nonimmediately executed
limit orders, while slow proprietary traders supply liquidity only via contrarian marketable orders. The
crisis, however, triggered a decline the in the placement of nonimmediately executable for small and
mid caps by fast proprietary traders. In that sense, some liquidity evaporated.
Our empirical ndings suggest that current regulatory reforms might have unintended negative
consequences:
 Under MIFID 2, trading venues will be required to cap the ratio of the number of messages to
the number of trades by participant. This might be counterproductive, as our ndings suggest
that fast proprietary traders rely on numerous cancellations and updates to reduce the adverse
selection cost incurred by their limit orders. Capping the percentage of cancellations and updates
could increase the adverse selection costs incurred by limit orders left in the book, and thus deter
the provision of liquidity by these orders. This could be harmful for market liquidity, especially
at times of market stresss, when the need to modify and cancel orders is particularly acute.
 In this context, new banking regulations, making it more di¢ cult and costly for banks to engage
in proprietary trading, might also reduce market liquidity.
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Figure 1, Panel A: Connection speed plotted against
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Figure 7: Momentum and contrarian
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Figure 8, Panel A: Marketable orders’ profits
(Mt+2min – Pt)/(Mt‐) * (sign of marketable order) * 100
‐0,0400
‐0,0300
‐0,0200
‐0,0100
0,0000
0,0100
0,0200
fast prop slow prop fast dual slow dual slow brokers
‐0,0010
‐0,0008
‐0,0006
‐0,0004
‐0,0002
0,0000
0,0002
0,0004
0,0006
Pre‐crisis Crisis Post‐crisis Pre‐crisis Crisis Post‐crisis
 small & mid caps  large caps
fast prop
slow prop
fast dual
slow dual
slow brokers
Figure 8, Panel B: Marketable orders’ profits by 
periods and by capitalization
Figure 9: 
Prob(marketable order n|marketable order n‐1)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
fast prop slow prop fast dual slow dual slow broker
marketable order at date t‐1
same trader, same direction
same trader, opp. direction
fast prop, same direction
fast prop, opp. Direction
slow prop, same direction
slow prop, opp. Direction
fast dual, same direction
fast dual, opp. Direction
slow dual, same direction
slow dual, opp. Direction
slow broker, same direction
slow broker, opp. Direction
Figure 10,panel A: Adverse selection cost for (non 
immediately executed) limit orders
(Mt+2min – Mt‐)/(Mt‐) * (sign of limit order) *100
‐0,0500
‐0,0450
‐0,0400
‐0,0350
‐0,0300
‐0,0250
‐0,0200
‐0,0150
‐0,0100
‐0,0050
0,0000
fast prop slow prop fast dual slow dual slow brokers
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